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Cone v. Nationwide: The Undue Narrowing
of the Liability Insurance Policy's Modern
Vehicular Exclusion
I. Introduction
In the late 1989 decision of Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co.,1 a sharply divided New York Court of Appeals sus-
tained a claim of negligent entrustment2 of a motor vehicle
under a homeowner's liability policy. The court held coverage
was owed despite the policy's express inclusion of the standard
modern vehicular exclusion, regularly enforced in other jurisdic-
tions and previously enforced by New York appellate courts.3
The standard vehicular exclusion typically eliminates personal
liability coverage' under general liability policies for accidents
"arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of ... a mo-
tor vehicle."5
The exclusion appears in homeowner, 6 comprehensive gen-
1. 75 N.Y.2d 747, 551 N.E.2d 92, 551 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1989).
2. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of an-
other whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his
youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable
risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to
share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm re-
sulting to them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)' OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
3. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wolford, 116 A.D.2d 1011, 498 N.Y.S.2d 631
(4th Dep't 1986).
4. There are two types of insurance coverage: third-party liability coverage and first-
party coverage. ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES 298 (2d ed. 1988). A
first-party insurer reimburses the insured for losses he incurs. Id. at 299. A third-party
liability insurer indemnifies the insured for sums he becomes legally obligated to pay
others. Id.
5. Cone, 75 N.Y.2d at 748, 551 N.E.2d at 93, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
6. A homeowner's policy is a personal comprehensive liability policy designed to
protect against risks that are home oriented. It is comparatively low in cost and intended
to insure against non-business and non-automobile risk. 7A JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INS. LAW
& PRACTICE § 4501.02 (Berdal ed. 1979).
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eral liability (CGL),7 all risk," and other general liability poli-
cies,9 which are comprehensive in scope because the risks in-
volved tend to be general or unspecified in nature."0 These
policies are not designed to cover vehicular accidenti because
such coverage would significantly increase the insurer's exposure
and, consequently, require an increase in insurance premiums.11
Instead, automobile liability insurance can be purchased to pro-
vide coverage for motor vehicle accidents.12
In finding the plaintiff's claim for third-party liability cover-
age valid under the homeowner's policy at issue in Cone, the
court of appeals held that the claim did not "arise out of the
ownership and use of a motor vehicle,'1 3 but rather out of the
policyholder's allegedly negligent entrustment of a dangerous in-
strumentality to his fourteen-year-old son. 4 According to the
majority, because the standard vehicular exclusion did not
"clearly exclude"1 5 coverage for such entrustment, the exclusion
did not preclude coverage under the policy.' 6
In reaching its conclusion, the Cone court did not appear to
consider whether the homeowner's policy was designed to cover
vehicular accidents; nor did it consider whether the insured, by
seeking coverage under a homeowner's policy, was simply trying
to get two types of coverage, motor vehicle liability and home-
owner liability, for the price of one. Each type is widely available
7. "[An] automobile policy protects against liability arising out of a particular activ-
ity, that is, the use, ownership or maintenance of an automobile, whereas the comprehen-
sive general liability [policy] protects for liability arising out of an accident or occur-
rence." Id. § 4492.03.
8. An all risk liability policy insures "all property risks, simply excluding those not
wanted." Clayton H. Farnham, All Risk - What Does It Mean?, in THE ALL RISK POL-
icy 2 (American Bar Association 1986).
9. See generally 7A APPLEMAN, supra note 6, §§ 4491-4552 for a discussion of vari-
ous liability coverages.
10. Insurance Co. of North America v. Waterhouse, 424 A.2d 675, 682 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1980).
11. David B. Harrison, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision Excluding
Liability for Automobile-Related Injuries or Damage From Coverage of Homeowner's or
Personal Liability Policy, 6 A.L.R. 4TH 555, 558 (1981).
12. Id.
13. Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.Y.2d 747, 748-49, 551 N.E.2d 92, 93,
551 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (1989).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 749, 551 N.E.2d at 93, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
16. Id.
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for its own premium. The court nevertheless afforded motor ve-
hicle liability coverage under a homeowner's liability policy, but
only after an exercise in insurance contract construction that
many, including three dissenting judges, have called into
question.
The Cone majority ruling essentially reaffirms the 1972 de-
cision of Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co.1 7 In Lalomia
the court required liability insurers to defend and indemnify
claims that alleged the negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle.
This precedential decision was rendered when the original, nar-
rower version of the vehicular exclusion was in use. 8 It did not
contain the "arising out of" language,1 9 and thus excluded only
claims that were directly related to the ownership, maintenance,
operation, or use of a motor vehicle.20 To clarify that liability
policies are meant to exclude not only incidents directly related
to ownership, maintenance, and operation of motor vehicles, but
any and all incidents arising out of such ownership or use, insur-
ers adopted the "arising out of" language which, prior to Cone,
had been enforced.2' Cone eliminated the force of that language
in New York, but did leave open to insurers the "opportunity to
clearly exclude claims based on negligent entrustment from cov-
erage in homeowner's liability policies."22
Generally, a liability insurer's obligation to defend and in-
demnify is determined by its contract [the insurance policy], not
by the theory of liability asserted against the insured.23 Coverage
exclusions are to be construed strictly against the insurer. 4
However, the terms of plainly written exclusions must be con-
17. 35 A.D.2d 114, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 830, 291
N.E.2d 724, 339 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972).
18. Gary Spencer, Auto Claims Sustained in Homeowner Policy, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21,
1989, at 1.
19. Id.
20. Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 35 A.D.2d 114, 116, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018,
1021 (2d Dep't 1970).
21. Exclusions/Automobile, INS. LITIGATION REPORTER, Apr. 1990, at 158.
22. Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.Y.2d 747, 749, 551 N.E.2d 92, 93,
551 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (1989).
23. Id. at 749, 551 N.E.2d at 94, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (citing in part Sperling v.
Great Am. Indem. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 442, 450, 166 N.E.2d 482, 486-87, 199 N.Y.S.2d 465, 471-
72 (1960)) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
24. Cone, 75 N.Y.2d at 749, 551 N.E.2d at 93, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
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strued to preclude coverage."
The Cone majority ignored the plain language of the mod-
ern vehicular exclusion and, in so doing, reached a conclusion
contrary to that of the overwhelming weight of authority
throughout the nation.26 As a result, most liability insurers217 are
being unduly forced to defend and indemnify negligent entrust-
ment claims brought in New York even though the vehicular ex-
clusion language clearly precludes such coverage.28
Part II of this Note examines the vehicular exclusion, both
prior to and after its modernization, and related New York cases
25. Id. at 749, 551 N.E.2d at 94, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
26. Id. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 757 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1985) (predicting
Alaska law); Cooter v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 344 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1977); Lumber-
mens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kosies, 124 Ariz. 136, 602 P.2d 517 (1979); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 261 Ark. 326, 547 S.W.2d 757 (1977); Safeco Ins. Co. v.
Gilstrap, 141 Cal. App. 3d 524, 190 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1983); Insurance Co. of North
America v. Waterhouse, 424 A.2d 675 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980); Gargano v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 384 So. 2d 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. King, 174 Ga.
App. 716, 331 S.E.2d 41 (1985); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Chief Clerk, 713 P.2d 427
(Haw. 1986); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGlawn, 84 Ill. App. 3d 107, 404 N.E.2d
1122 (1980); Picou v. Ferrara, 412 So. 2d 1297 (La. 1982); American Universal Ins. Co. v.
Cummings, 475 A.2d 1136 (Me. 1984); Pedersen v. Republic Ins. Co., 72 Md. App. 661,
532 A.2d 183 (1987); Barnstable County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lally, 374 Mass. 602, 373
N.E.2d 966 (1978); Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sunstrum, 111 Mich. App. 98, 315 N.W.2d
154 (1981); Fillmore v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 344 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984);
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Politte, 663 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Senteney v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 101 Nev. 654, 707 P.2d 1149 (1985); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Grondin, 119 N.H.
394, 402 A.2d 174 (1979); Williamson v. Continental Cas. Co., 201 N.J. Super. 95, 492
A.2d 1028 (App. Div. 1985); Potosky v. Fejes, 23 Ohio Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.E.2d 494
(1986); Farmers Ins. Group v. Nelsen, 78 Or. App. 213, 715 P.2d 492 (1986); Pulleyn v..
Cavalier Ins. Corp., 351 Pa. Super. 347, 505 A.2d 1016 (1986); Great Cent. Ins. Co. v.
Roemmich, 291 N.W.2d 772 (S.D. 1980); Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters v. McManus,
633 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1982); Farmers Ins. Group v. Johnson, 43 Wash. App. 39, 715 P.2d
144 (1986); Bankert by Habush v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Wis. 2d 469, 329
N.W.2d 150 (1983) (as cited in Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 868 F.2d 893, 898 n.6
(7th Cir. 1989)).
27. At least one carrier has added language explicitly excluding coverage for these
claims. The Insurance Company of North America (now CIGNA), the homeowner carrier
that lost in Lalomia, added these words to the policy in bold print: "We will not cover
claims that arise because you or another covered person entrusts a motor vehicle to any
person." CIGNA HOMEOWNERS INS. POLICY. Form B - Broad Form, Claims We Will
Not Cover, p. 15. An insurer may not alter the policy form language at policy renewal
time without the approval of the New York Superintendent of Insurance, which must be
satisfied that the new form contains at least substantially equivalent value in the aggre-
gate of benefits. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3425(d)(3) (McKinney 1985).
28. Cone, 75 N.Y.2d at 749, 551 N.E.2d at 94, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
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resolving liability coverage questions. The Cone decision and its
progeny are fully discussed in Part III. Part IV examines the
analysis many courts have utilized in logically finding the vehic-
ular exclusion applicable when a claim for the negligent entrust-
ment of a motor vehicle is brought. New York's rules for insur-
ance contract interpretation are also summarized.
This Note concludes that the Cone precedent overburdens
general liability policyholders. The court's narrow interpretation
of the vehicular exclusion inflates each general liability carrier's
monetary exposure. Carriers are now forced to defend and in-
demnify motor vehicle accident personal injury claims whenever
plaintiff's counsel chooses to include a cause of action for negli-
gent entrustment. The general liability carrier's vast exposure
necessitates policyholder premium hikes. Only automobile poli-
cyholders should pay for insurance to cover claims arising from
vehicular accidents. Unfortunately, low automobile policy limits
force accident victims to seek recovery from "deep pocket" gen-
eral liability insurers. This Note proposes that the state's
mandatory minimum automobile policy limits of $10,000 per
person/$20,000 per occurrence be raised to $25,000/$50,000, so
that the majority of accident victims can be fully compensated
by automobile insurers.
II. Background
A. The Tort of Negligent Entrustment
Since 1937, New York has recognized the common law prin-
ciple that holds parents or masters liable for negligently entrust-
ing to a child or servant an instrument whose nature, use, and
purpose make it so dangerous in the latter's hands that it consti-
tutes an unreasonable risk to others.29 A cause of action in negli-
gent entrustment arises after an accident occurs involving the
entrustee's use of the dangerous instrumentality." Most fact
patterns involve parent-child or master-servant relationships,3
29. Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 A.D. 518, 519, 293 N.Y.S. 147, 149 (2d Dep't 1937)
(construing HARPER'S LAW OF TORTS § 283 (1933)).
30. Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, Negligent Entrustment, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13,
1988, at 1.
31. Id. See, e.g., Leek v. McGlone, 162 A.D.2d 504, 556 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2d Dep't
1990); Camillone v. Popham, 157 A.D.2d 816, 550 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't 1990).
1992]
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
in which the parent or master is capable of controlling the in-
strument's use.3 2 In assessing negligence, analysis turns on the
entrustor's knowledge of the entrustee's youth and inexperience,
propensity for reckless and irresponsible behavior, or any other
qualities "indicating the possibility that [he] will cause injury"
while in possession of the instrument.3
In Nolechek v. Gesuale,34 the New York Court of Appeals
defined the negligent entrustment tort and listed chattel that
would qualify as dangerous instrumentalities under particular
circumstances. The list included bicycles, lawn mowers, power
tools, motorcycles, and automobiles.36
In Nolechek, a sixteen-year-old boy was killed when the mo-
torcycle he was operating struck a suspended steel cable.3 ' His
father had given him the motorcycle even though he was blind
in one eye, of limited vision in the other, and had no driver's
license.37 The accident occurred shortly after the boy had
switched motorcycles with a friend.3 8 Defendants in the wrongful
death claim brought by the father, counterclaimed for contribu-
tion on a theory of negligent entrustment. 9 The father lost a
dismissal argument at the trial court level but prevailed on ap-
peal.4 0 The defendants then sought relief from New York's high-
est court.41
The New York Court of Appeals ordered the negligent en-
trustment counterclaim reinstated. 2 The high court held that
the father might have breached a duty to protect third parties
from harm43 caused by his son's improvident use of a motorcy-
32. Carmona v. Padilla, 4 A.D.2d 181, 183, 163 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (1st Dep't 1957),
aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 767, 149 N.E.2d 337, 172 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1958).
33. J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW § 33.01 (rev. ed. 1990).
34. 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978).
35. Nolechek, 46 N.Y.2d at 338, 385 N.E.2d at 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
36. Id. at 337, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
37. Id. at 335-36, 385 N.E.2d at 1270, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
38. Id. at 337, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
39. Id. at 335-36, 385 N.E.2d at 1270, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 342. Defendants in Nolechek
were the owners of the land where the accident occurred and the adjacent land, the
town, and the town's superintendent of highways. Id.
40. Id. at 336, 385 N.E.2d at 1270, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 336, 385 N.E.2d at 1270, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
43. In Nolechek, the harm to third parties was not direct; it was financial harm
resulting from potential liability for the child's death. Id. at 339, 385 N.E.2d at 1272, 413
[Vol. 12:1,99
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cle - a chattel constituting a dangerous instrumentality the fa-
ther could control.4
B. The Traditional Vehicular Exclusion
The New York Court of Appeals examined the issue of
homeowner's policy coverage for the negligent entrustment tort
twenty years ago in Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co."5 At
that time, the homeowner's policy issued by the Insurance Com-
pany of North America (INA) required the company to "pay all
sums which the insured would become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of personal injury or property damage." The
policy excluded from coverage, however, " 'the ownership, main-
tenance, operation, use, loading or unloading' of automobiles...
'2946
Lalomia stemmed from an accident between a car occupied
by the Lalomia family and a motorized bicycle powered by a
gasoline engine and operated by Daniel Maddock's twelve-year-
old son. 7 The bicycle had no brakes and could be stopped only
by "shorting" the sparkplug.4 8 The twelve-year-old and Mrs.
Lalomia were killed in the crash.'9
Subsequently, Mr. Lalomia commenced a declaratory judg-
ment action to determine whether either Maddock's automobile
or homeowner liability policy provided coverage for his wife's
wrongful death.50 The Second Department ruled that the motor-
ized bicycle fell outside Maddock's automobile policy's defini-
tion of an automobile,51 and released his automobile insurer
from liability.52 Instead, Lalomia's automobile insurer was re-
quired to cover the Lalomia claim53 under the uninsured motor-
N.Y.S.2d at 345.
44. Id. at 336, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
45. 35 A.D.2d 114, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (2d Dep't 1970), afl'd, 31 N.Y.2d 830, 291
N.E.2d 724, 339 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972).
46. Lalomia, 35 A.D.2d at 116, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
47. Id. at 115-16, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1019.
48. Id. at 116, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
49. Id. at 115, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1019.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 116, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 116-17, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1020-21.
19921
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ist endorsement.5'
The Second Department then turned its analysis to the
traditional vehicular exclusion in Maddock's INA homeowner's
policy. Because the policy defined "automobile" as a "land mo-
tor vehicle," the motorized bicycle qualified as a vehicle for pur-
poses of the exclusion 5 Consequently, coverage as to the owner-
ship, maintenance, operation, or use of the bicycle was
precluded. 6
However, Lalomia's theory that Maddock was negligent for
placing a dangerous instrumentality in his son's possession,
knowing it could be used in a dangerous manner likely to cause
harm, was a valid cause of action grounded in common law, 7
and was not directly related to the "ownership, maintenance, op-
eration, [or] use"5" of the vehicle. The negligent entrustment
claim thus fell outside the scope of the vehicular exclusion.5
Therefore, INA was required to defend and indemnify Maddock
for any judgment against him on the theory of negligent entrust-
ment."' Lalomia, affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals in
1972,1 set a state precedent for interpreting the traditional ve-
hicular exclusion that dominated throughout the decade.
In a New York Supreme Court case decided later that year,
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Chahalis,62 a homeowner
carrier was forced to cover a negligent entrustment claim
brought against a father, after his son, an alleged drug addict,
54. Automobile policies generally contain an uninsured motorist endorsement that
provides liability coverage for personal injury claims brought by insureds who have been
struck by uninsured drivers. Such coverage is mandatory in New York. N.Y. INS. LAW §
3420(f)(1) (McKinney 1985).
55. Lalomia, 35 A.D.2d at 117, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
56. Id. at 116-17, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
57. Id. at 117, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1020-21 (citing Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 A.D. 518,
519, 293 N.Y.S. 147, 149 (2d Dep't 1937)).
58. Lalomia, 35 A.D.2d at 117, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1021.
59. Id. (citing McDonald v. The Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 501, 503-04, 235 A.2d
480, 482 (App. Div. 1967)). In McDonald, the insured minor son, who had allegedly been
drinking alcohol, drove into a tree while operating a car his parents had purchased for
him. His passenger was killed in the crash. McDonald, 97 N.J. Super. at 502-03, 235 A.2d
at 481.
60. Lalomia, 35 A.D.2d at 117, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 1021.
61. Lalomia, 31 N.Y.2d 830, 833, 291 N.E.2d 724, 724, 339 N.Y.S.2d 680, 680 (1972).
62. 72 Misc. 2d 207, 338 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
[Vol. 12:199
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struck another car. 3 The automobile accident occurred while
the son was driving a car allegedly paid for and given to him by
his father." The homeowner carrier brought an action for a de-
termination of its liability under the policy after the occupants
of the other car sued both father and son. 5 The occupants col-
lected the son's'auto liability policy limits, and continued their
claim against the father.6
The court followed Lalomia, reasoning that although the
policy did not cover "the ownership, maintenance, operation,
use, loading or unloading of... automobiles,' 6 7 the father's al-
leged liability was not claimed through his "ownership, mainte-
nance, operation [or] use"68 of the car. Rather, liability stemmed
from the fact that the father had allowed his son to have and
operate a car despite his knowledge of the boy's condition and
possible consequential unsafe auto operation.6
Although facts relating to the "ownership, maintenance, op-
eration [or] use"' 70 of the car had to be developed under the neg-
ligent entrustment claim, the court found these facts pertinent
only to establish a causal relationship between the unreasonable
entrustment and the later occurrence of the accident.71 Such
facts did not affect the gravamen of the claim against the father
which, in the court's view, was not excluded from coverage. 72
In a subsequent New York Supreme Court case, Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co.,73 an automobile insurer obtained a
declaratory judgment to force a homeowner insurer to cover a
negligent entrustment claim."' The underlying action was
brought by a minor daughter against her mother for injuries she
sustained while operating a car her mother had permitted her to
63. Id. at 210, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
64. Id. at 208, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 209, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 210, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 85 Misc. 2d 734, 380 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
74. Id. at 738, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
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use. 5 The traditional vehicular exclusion in the mother's home-
owner policy was found not to relieve the carrier from
coverage.7"
The Allstate court ruled that the negligent entrustment ac-
tion was "only incidentally related to the 'ownership, mainte-
nance, operation [or] use' of the .. .car."" Instead, the action
was principally based upon the mother's negligent entrustment
of a dangerous instrument.78 In the court's words, "Lalomia set-
tles the question of liability under a [h]omeowner's policy for
entrustment of a dangerous thing, even if the dangerous thing
[happens] to be a car.' '7 9
The Third Department applied the reasoning of the
Lalomia court8 ° in Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hunter,"' a case
that stemmed from an accident involving a truck and a teenage
motorcyclist in which the motorcycle passenger was killed. 2 The
motorcycle owner was sued for negligently entrusting a danger-
ous instrumentality to his son, and he requested defense and in-
demnification from his homeowner's insurer.8 3 The insurer re-
fused and filed for a declaratory judgment precluding coverage. 4
As expected, the court followed precedent and ordered the
insurer to defend and indemnify the motorcycle owner." Relying
on Lalomia, the court concluded that "the theory of action was
not directly related to the 'ownership, maintenance, operation or
use' of the vehicle ' 86 and thus fell outside the vehicular
exclusion. 7
75. Id. at 737, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
76. Id. at 738-39, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
77. Id. at 738, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 739, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
80. For Lalomia reasoning, see supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
81. 63 A.D.2d 200, 406 N.Y.S.2d 625 (3d Dep't 1978).
82. Id. at 201, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 626. In Heritage, the insured's fifteen-year-old son
permitted a fourteen-year-old (Hajdu) to operate the unregistered motorcycle. Without
the fifteen-year-old son's consent, Hajdu let another boy operate the motorcycle while he
rode as passenger. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 202, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 35 A.D.2d 114, 117, 312
N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1021 (2d Dep't 1970)).
(Vol. 12:199
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C. The Modern Vehicular Exclusion
In the mid-1970's, liability insurers added the phrase "aris-
ing out of" to the "ownership, maintenance, operation, use of a
motor vehicle" exclusion to broaden its scope and avoid coverage
for negligent entrustment claims.8 Until Cone, this addition
achieved its desired effect. 89
State and federal courts throughout the country generally
recognize that liability for these claims is dependent upon an
entrustee's negligent use of the vehicle.90 Therefore, any negli-
gent entrustment claim indeed "arises out of" the use of the ve-
hicle and thus falls within the modern vehicular exclusion.9 1
Prior to the Cone decision, New York courts construing the
modern vehicular exclusion followed this reasoning. Liability in-
surers were relieved of defending and indemnifying actions al-
leging the negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle as well as
actions alleging other types of negligence that were construed to
fall within the exclusion.2
For instance, in Ruggerio v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.,93 a
taxi company was released from liability under its comprehen-
sive general liability (CGL) policy because the causes of action
brought after a vehicular accident were negligent hiring and neg-
ligent entrustment. 4 The taxi driver, who was drunk when his
88. The words "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile"
were already being used in automobile policies to define instances where coverage ap-
plied, and had been interpreted by a New York court in Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v.
General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 66 Misc. 2d 952, 322 N.Y.S.2d 806 (N.Y.
County Ct. 1971). "The words... are broad and comprehensive terms meaning 'originat-
ing from' or 'having its origin in' or 'growing out of' or 'flowing from.' " Id. at 955, 322
N.Y.S.2d at 810 (citing Red Ball Motor Freight Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
189 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1951)).
89. Exclusions/Automobile, supra note 21, at 158.
90. Harrison, supra note 11, at 572.
91. Id. The only exceptions are found in the Tenth Circuit in Milbank Ins. Co. v.
Garcia, 779 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1985); Douglass v. Hartford Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 934 (10th
Cir. 1979) (applying Colorado law); United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Day, 657 P.2d 981 (Colo.
App. 1982) (an intermediate appellate court decision). The Colorado Supreme Court
overruled Day in Northern Ins. Co. v. Ekstrom, 784 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1989). See infra
notes 164-99 and accompanying text. Exclusions/Automobile, supra note 21, at 158-59.
92. See Norman H. Dachs & Jonathan A. Dachs, Insurance and No-Fault Law,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13, 1990, at 7, cols. 2, 3.
93. 107 A.D.2d 744, 484 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 1985).
94. Ruggerio, 107 A.D.2d at 744-45, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 106-07.
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taxi struck another car, did not possess a taxi driver's license
because his operator's license had been suspended due to his
record of driving while intoxicated.9 5 After the accident victim
obtained a judgment against the taxi driver's employer, she
sought to recover the proceeds of the employer's CGL policy.96
The CGL policy, however, contained the standard vehicular
exclusion for liability "'arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, operation [or] use' of an automobile."97 The trial court
found the exclusion applicable because "no harm [was done] to
the plaintiffs until [the driver] got behind the wheel . . ."I' The
Second Department agreed, 99 ruling that the theories of negli-
gence in hiring an incompetent, unqualified driver and dispatch-
ing him in a drunken state did "'no more than provide reasons
or subfactors ...' "0 to explain why the accident arose out of
the operation of a vehicle. 10'
As a result of the exclusion, the accident victim was limited
to collecting the taxi company's minimum automobile policy
limit of $10,000102 on a theory of vicarious liability,"0 3 despite
her judgment in excess of $200,000.1'0 The court sympathized
with her nominal recovery, but believed the problem lay in the
meager automobile policy limits, an issue that could be ad-
dressed only by the state legislature.'0 5
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wolford,'0°  the
Fourth Department upheld a New York Supreme Court declara-
95. Id. at 744, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 745, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
101. Id. at 745, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (citing Duncan Petroleum Transp. v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 96 A.D.2d 942, 943, 466 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 665, 460
N.E.2d 229, 472 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1983)).
102. Id. at 745, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
103. Vicarious liability is defined as the principle that the vehicle owner is liable for
injuries to persons or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such vehicle,
in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using it with permission, ex-
press or implied, of the owner. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388(1) (McKinney 1986). See
infra note 227.
104. Ruggerio, 107 A.D.2d at 745, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
105. Id. See also infra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
106. 116 A.D.2d 1011, 498 N.Y.S.2d 631 (4th Dep't 1986).
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tory judgment that released a homeowner carrier from liability
in a wrongful' ° entrustment claim. 10 8 The plaintiff in the under-
lying action had sued the insured for wrongfully entrusting his
automobile to a younger brother who later collided with the
plaintiff. 0 9 In a terse opinion, the court ruled that the accident
had arisen out of the younger brother's operation of a motor ve-
hicle and, therefore, fell within the policy's specific vehicular
exclusion.11°
Another case discussing the issue of coverage under a liabil-
ity policy, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co.,"' stemmed from an explosion of an overloaded, parked, dy-
namite-laden truck.1 2 Subsequent lawsuits alleged negligent use
of the truck and negligent business practices by the explosives
company, which had insurance under business-auto and CGL
policies. 3
On appeal, the Fourth Department interpreted the language
" 'arising out of'" to determine that the modern standard vehic-
ular exclusion precluded coverage by the CGL policy." 4 The
court remarked that "[tihe words 'arising out of' have 'broader
significance than the words "caused by," and are ordinarily un-
derstood to mean originating from, incident to, or having con-
nection with the use of the vehicle.' ""' Because the claims arose
from the explosion of an overloaded truck being used to trans-
port explosives, "the claims [had] a connection with the use of
the truck and [fell] within the risk covered by the [business-
auto] policy," and outside the risk covered by the CGL policy."'
Finally, in Duncan Petroleum Transp. v. Aetna Ins. Co.," 7
107. According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990), the term "wrongful"
is more comprehensive than the term "negligent." Negligent acts are inadvertent, id. at
1032; wrongful acts are "wilful, wanton, [and] reckless." Id. at 1612.
108. State Farm, 116 A.D.2d at 1011, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1011-12, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
111. 91 A.D.2d 317, 459 N.Y.S.2d 158 (4th Dep't 1983).
112. Id. at 318-19, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 159-60.
113. Id. at 319, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
114. Id. at 320, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
115. Id. at 320-21, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 161 (quoting 6B JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INS. LAW &
PRACTICE § 4317 (Buckley ed. 1979)). See also 12 COUCH'S CYCLOPEDIA OF INS. LAW §
45:61 (2d ed. 1959).
116. Aetna, 91 A.D.2d at 321, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
117. 96 A.D.2d 942, 466 N.Y.S.2d 394 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 665, 460 N.E.2d
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the insured sought a declaratory judgment regarding a CGL in-
surer's obligation to provide coverage when an explosion oc-
curred while gasoline was being pumped from one tractor-trailer
to another. " 8 Although the trial court held for the insured, the
Second Department reversed, finding that the insurer did not
have a duty to provide coverage. " ' A negligent entrustment is-
sue did not arise, but the insured claimed the accident had been
caused by negligent acts that were covered, such as: failure to
inspect the vehicles, failure to supervise and train personnel,
failure to properly design and maintain the vehicles, and use of
dangerous transfer procedures. 20
Prior to institution of the declaratory judgment action, the
insured had submitted the claim to its CGL insurer, but cover-
age was denied because of the exclusion for "bodily injury ...
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, load-
ing or unloading of any [vehicle] .. ". ."I" In its analysis, the
Second Department used reasoning analogous to that in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,"2 to conclude
that the allegations of negligence were mere factors of causation
that did no more than explain why the accident arose out of the
loading or Unloading of the vehicle.
Acts or omissions which predated the loading operation but
which allegedly brought about the explosion during the loading
do not prevent invocation of the exclusion clause. Whatever the
originating reason for the explosion, it arose out of the use of the
vehicles while they were being loaded.123
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Second De-
partment's reversal, stating:
despite an insurer's broad duty to defend and despite an insurer's
difficult burden of establishing that a policy exclusion is unam-
229, 472 N'Y.S.2d 88 (1983).
118. Duncan, 96 A.D.2d at 942, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 943, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
121. Id. at 942, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
122. Brief for Respondent at 10, Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 149 A.D.2d
992, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (4th Dep't), rev'd, 75 N.Y.2d 747, 551 N.E.2d 92, 551 N.Y.S.2d
891 (1989) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. For a discussion of Aetna Casualty, see
supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
123. Duncan, 96 A.D.2d at 943, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
[Vol. 12:199
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/6
1992] CONE v. NATIONWIDE
biguously applicable to the claims in issue, it was clear that Aetna
had fully met its burden by demonstrating that the aforesaid ex-
clusion of its [CGL] policy was applicable to the instant situation
... and . . . despite the claims that the accident was caused by
varying types and degrees of negligence with respect to the gaso-
line transfer, nothing about those asserted factors, even if they
were actually involved in causing the explosion, would negate the
unequivocal and unchallenged fact that the accident arose out of
the loading or unloading of the automobile. '4
In none of the above four cases"2 5 involving the modern ve-
hicular exclusion did the courts make any attempt to distinguish
or explain the conclusions reached by the high court in Lalomia
v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co.1 26 Indeed, except for one cite in
the Duncan dissenting opinion," 7 the Lalomia case was never
mentioned. 12 This suggests that New York courts viewed the
change in the exclusion language as a general resolution of the
negligent entrustment coverage issue.
III. The Cone Case and its Progeny
A. Facts
The plaintiff in Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
owned a three-wheel all-terrain vehicle (ATV).1 2'9 His fourteen-
124. Duncan Petroleum Transp., Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 61 N.Y.2d 665, 666-67, 460
N.E.2d 229, 229, 472 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88 (1983).
125. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wolford, 116 A.D.2d 1011, 498 N.Y.S.2d 631
(4th Dep't 1986), supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text; Ruggerio v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Co., 107 A.D.2d 744, 484 N.Y.S.2d 106 (3d Dep't 1985), supra notes 93-105 and
accompanying text; Duncan Petroleum Transp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 96 A.D.2d 942, 466
N.Y.S.2d 394 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 665, 460 N.E.2d 229, 472 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1983),
supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 91 A.D.2d 317, 459 N.Y.S.2d 158 (4th Dep't 1983), supra notes 111-16 and accompa-
nying text.
126. Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 35 A.D.2d 114, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (2d
Dep't 1970), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 830, 291 N.E.2d 724, 339 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972). For a discus-
sion of Lalomia, see supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
127. Duncan, 96 A.D.2d at 945, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 398 (citing Lalomia v. Bankers &
Shippers Ins. Co., 35 A.D.2d 114, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (2d Dep't 1970), afl'd, 31 N.Y.2d
830, 291 N.E.2d 724, 339 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972)) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
128. Dachs & Dachs, supra note 92, at 7, col. 3.
129. Brief for Appellant at 2, Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 149 A.D.2d
992, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (4th Dep't), rev'd, 75 N.Y.2d 747, 551 N.E.2d 92, 551 N.Y.S.2d
891 (1989) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
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year-old son was operating the vehicle on a public highway in
Portville, New York, when it collided with a pickup truck. 130
The boy sustained serious fractures of the femur, tibia, and fib-
ula; poor healing ultimately necessitated a bone graft
operation.'
Plaintiff Cone had a homeowner's policy with Nationwide
that specifically excluded coverage for bodily injury or property
damage "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of...
a motor vehicle." '132 The boy qualified as an insured and the
ATV qualified as a motor vehicle under the homeowner policy
terms.133
Cone, as father and natural guardian of his injured son,
commenced a personal injury action against Williams, the owner
and operator of the pickup truck.' Williams counterclaimed
against Cone, alleging that he:
was reckless, careless and negligent and that he caused, suffered,
permitted and allowed an improperly equipped motor vehicle to
be operated upon the public highways ... and was further reck-
less, careless and negligent and that he permitted and allowed the
operation of an unregistered motor vehicle upon the highways of
the State, by an inexperienced, unfit, unqualified and an unli-
censed operator and entrusted a dangerous instrumentality to
(his son) knowing that (his son) was unfit and unqualified to
properly handle and/or manage same and knowing that such dan-
gerous instrumentalities could be used in a manner which was
dangerous to others and likely to cause harm to others. 35
Cone requested his homeowner carrier, Nationwide, to de-
fend and indemnify him on the counterclaim.3 6 Nationwide re-
fused on the ground that the accident arose out of the "owner-
ship, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle," which was
excluded under the policy. 137
130. Brief for Appellant, supra note 129, at 2.
131. Telephone Interview with Robert Kribs, Claimsperson for Nationwide Ins. Co.
(Oct. 1, 1990).
132. Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.Y.2d 747, 748, 551 N.E.2d 92, 93,
551 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (1989).
133. Brief for Respondent, supra note 122, at 3-4.
134. Cone, 75 N.Y.2d at 748, 551 N.E.2d at 93, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
135. Brief for Appellant, supra note 129, at 2.
136. Cone, 75 N.Y.2d at 748, 551 N.E.2d at 93, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
137. Id.
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B. Procedural History
In response to Nationwide's denial of coverage, Cone com-
menced a declaratory judgment action.'38 Upon completion of
discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment.1 39 "After
full briefing and [a] memorandum decision . . ., judgment was
granted on behalf of [Nationwide] and a declaration was entered
that no coverage existed under the policy ... ""0 The ruling led
to an appeal before the Fourth Department, where the trial
court decision was unanimously affirmed without opinion. 4' The
Court of Appeals granted leave on June 30, 1989.142
C. The Cone Majority Decision
The New York high court reversed the unanimous Fourth
Department and entered judgment for Cone, declaring that Na-
tionwide was obligated to defend and indemnify him on the neg-
ligent entrustment counterclaim.' 43 The four-to-three vote un-
derscored the controversy surrounding the coverage question.'44
Without explanation the Cone majority strayed from the
reasoning of past New York decisions and, despite the existence
of a broadened exclusion, resurrected Lalomia.'4' In the court's
words:
The exclusion from coverage - always as a matter of inter-
pretation construed strictly against the insurer - is governed by
Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., where we held that a
cause of action sounding in common-law negligence, predicated
on the entrustment of a "motor vehicle", was separate and dis-
tinct from claims excluded by a clause virtually identical to the
one now at issue. Any minor variation in language between "aris-
ing out of" (the one here) and "based directly on" .. is too insig-
138. Id.
139. Brief for Respondent, supra note 122, at 2.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.Y.2d 747, 748, 551 N.E.2d 92, 93,
551 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (1989).
144. Gary Spencer, Auto Claim Sustained in Homeowner Policy, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21,
1989, at 1, col. 3.
145. Dachs & Dachs, supra note 92.
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nificant to permit varying legal consequences.'4
The majority reasoned that since Lalomia, "insurers have
had an opportunity to clearly exclude claims based on negligent
entrustment from coverage in homeowner's liability policies.
They cannot be said to have accomplished that significant
change by the ambiguous, as used here, 'arising out of' lan-
guage." 147 Because the focus of the dispute was the negligent
entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality, a matter the major-
ity deemed "not directly related" to the child's negligent opera-
tion, and because the broadened exclusion language was found
to have no effect on the coverage issue, the rule of Lalomia
prevailed.' 4 8
This unpopular decision in essence overruled Duncan Pe-
troleum Transp. v. Aetna Ins. Co.,"' 9 in which the same court
had found the same exclusion language preclusive of coverage
under similar facts.1 5° Yet, just as the high court majority had
ignored Lalomia when it decided Duncan, it ignored Duncan
when it decided Cone.15 '
146. Cone, 75 N.Y.2d at 749, 551 N.E.2d at 93, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 892 (citation
omitted).
147. Id. at 749, 551 N.E.2d at 93, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
148. Id. For a discussion of the Lalomia rule, see supra notes 55-61 and accompany-
ing text.
149. For a discussion of Duncan, see supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
150. Duncan Petroleum Transp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 96 A.D.2d 942, 943, 466 N.Y.S.2d
394, 395 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 665, 460 N.E.2d 229, 472 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1983).
151. Dachs & Dachs, supra note 92. The Cone decision was followed by the Second
Department when it granted a motion for reargument of an appeal from a trial court
judgment. See Byer v. Continental Ins. Co., N.Y.L.J., June 7, 1990, at 31, col. 1. The
decision of Nov. 13, 1989, had affirmed a judgment relieving an insurer from the duty to
defend or indemnify a homeowner in a case with facts nearly identical to those in Cone.
Byer v. Continental Ins. Co., 155 A.D.2d 503, 503, 547 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364 (1989), vacated
on reh'g, 161 A.D.2d 744, 558 N.Y.S.2d 847 (2d Dep't 1990). In Byer, the infant son of
the insureds, operating his father's three-wheeled ATV, hit a pedestrian who claimed
injury. Id. The homeowner policy contained the standard modern vehicular exclusion. Id.
For the facts of Cone, see supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
Following reargument in May 1990, the November 1989 decision was vacated. Byer
at 31, col. 1. In a new decision, the insurer was ordered to defend the insureds in the
underlying personal injury action and to indemnify them, subject to the policy limits,
against any liability imposed on them for their negligent entrustment of a vehicle to
their son. Id. The Second Department found the material facts of Byer indistinguishable
from those in Cone and thus ruled in accordance with the Cone decision. Id.
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D. Justice Kaye's Dissent
Justice Kaye's persuasive dissent, joined by two others,1 51
made Cone a four-to-three decision. '53 Justice Kaye vehemently
criticized the majority's dismissal of the distinction between
damages "arising out of" and damages "directly related to the
'ownership, maintenance, operation'" and use of a vehicle'54 as
insignificant.' 55 A logical'analysis of Cone and Lalomia led her
to conclude that the cases are entirely distinguishable because of
the additional exclusion language.' 56 She noted that the change
in language "has often been recognized as a basis for distin-
guishing Lalomia"'' " and supported her conclusion with refer-
ence to an abundance of caselaw.' 5
IV. Analysis
A. New York is the Sole Dissenter
Now that Colorado no longer requires coverage for vehicular
negligent entrustment claims under the modern exclusion, New
York is the only state jurisdiction that does.' 59 Indeed, as Justice
Kaye noted in her powerful Cone dissent,'60 "[o]verwhelmingly,
152. Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.Y.2d 747, 751, 551 N.E.2d 92, 95,
551 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (1989) (Kaye, J., joined by Alexander and Hancock, JJ.
dissenting).
153. Spencer, supra note 144.
154. Cone, 75 N.Y.2d at 750, 551 N.E.2d at 94, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
155. Id. (citing Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 35 A.D.2d 114, 117, 312
N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1021 (2d Dep't 1970), afl'd, 31 N.Y.2d 830, 291 N.E.2d 724, 339 N.Y.S.2d
680 (1972)) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
156. Cone, 75 N.Y.2d at 750, 551 N.E.2d at 94, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 750, 551 N.E.2d at 94, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 893; see also Standard Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Bailey, 868 F.2d 893, 899-900 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989). See supra note 26 and accompa-
nying text.
159. The Colorado Supreme Court overruled a contrary appellate decision rendered
eight years earlier at a time when a split of authority on the issue existed. Exclusions!
Automobile, supra note 21, at 159. Northern Ins. Co. v. Ekstrom, 784 P.2d 320 (Colo.
1989), overruled United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Day, 657 P.2d 981 (Colo. App. 1982). See
supra note 91. Since then, the large majority of courts have found vehicular negligent
entrustment claims to be barred from general liability coverage. Northern, 784 P.2d at
324-25 n.3. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
160. Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.Y.2d 747, 749, 551 N.E.2d 92, 93,
551 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (1989) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
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courts throughout the country that have construed such a stan-
dard policy exclusion have found it applicable to claimed negli-
gent entrustment."'' Justice Kaye based her statement on a
statistic from Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bailey 6' that twenty-
eight of thirty-one jurisdictions examining whether the vehicular
exclusion is applicable to negligent entrustment claims have
ruled affirmatively.163
In Northern Ins. Co. v. Ekstrom,' the Colorado high court
sitting en banc overruled United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Day,'65
an eight-year-old appellate ruling, and held that a CGL and spe-
cial multi-peril liability policy's exclusion for liabifity "arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of
any automobile" did indeed preclude coverage for a negligent
entrustment claim. 6  Interestingly, the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision was rendered just one day before the New York
Court of Appeals decided Cone.167
After the insured employee in Northern collided with a car
while driving a truck either owned by or on loan to the insured,
the car driver sued the insured, alleging, inter alia, negligent en-
trustment of the truck to the employee.'6 8 In addition to having
a $500,000 automobile policy with Maryland Casualty, the in-
sured had coverage with Northern.6 9 The Northern liability pol-
icy also had a $500,000 limit; it contained both CGL and special
multi-peril provisions, along with the standard vehicular
161. Id. at 750, 551 N.E.2d at 94, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
162. Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 868 F.2d 893, 898 n.6 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing
case law from numerous jurisdictions including the New York case, Ruggerio v. Aetna
Life & Cas. Co., 107 A.D.2d 744, 484 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 1985)).
163. Standard, 868 F.2d at 898.
164. 784 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1989).
165. 657 P.2d 981 (Colo. App. 1982). In Day, the court held that a homeowner's
liability policy did not exclude coverage for a negligent entrustment claim. Id. at 984.
The court concluded that liability for negligent entrustment arose out of the personal
conduct of the insured, which did not involve the use of a vehicle. Id. at 983. Because
claims based on the personal conduct of the insured existing separately from the use of
the vehicle were not precisely excluded by the policy, coverage was owed. Id. at 984.
166. Northern, 784 P.2d at 321.
167. The Northern decision is dated December 18, 1989; the Cone decision is dated
December 19, 1989.
168. Northern, 784 P.2d at 321. The court noted that the record did not clearly
state whether the truck was owned or loaned to the insured. Id.
169. Id. at 321.
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exclusion.'7 0
The plaintiff obtained a two million dollar personal injury
judgment, collected the $500,000 automobile policy proceeds,
and filed a garnishment proceeding to obtain the Northern
CGL/special multi-peril policy proceeds. 17' She argued that the
modern vehicular exclusion was ambiguous and prevailed at
both the trial and appellate levels,' 72 but lost when the Colorado
high court found that the exclusion unambiguously precluded
coverage.1 73 The Colorado Supreme Court espoused two princi-
ples in support of its conclusion: the use of a vehicle is an essen-
tial element of negligent entrustment, and the dovetail concept
applies to negligent entrustment cases. 74
1. Use of a Vehicle is an Essential Element of Negligent
Entrustment
For an accident victim's claim of negligent entrustment of a
dangerous instrumentality to be successful, both the entrustor
and the entrustee must be found negligent.' 75 The fact that the
owner negligently entrusted a vehicle does not prove his act was
the proximate cause' 76 of the accident and injury. To establish
proximate causation, a plaintiff must also prove that the en-
trustee drove the vehicle negligently "and that his negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident. ' 17 7 In other words, the
act of entrusting - knowing that the entrustee is inexperienced
or incompetent - constitutes negligence. "[Entrusting] be-
comes [the] proximate cause of the injury when it combines with
the negligent acts of the [entrustee] causing the damage.' 78
The Northern'79 high court reasoned that "[s]ince one ele-
ment of a negligent entrustment claim must be the negligent use
170. Id.
171. Id. at 322.
172. Northern Ins. Co. v. Ekstrom, 762 P.2d 741 (Colo. App. 1988), relying on
United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Day, 657 P.2d 981 (Colo. App. 1982). See supra note 165.
173. Northern, 784 P.2d at 324.
174. Id. at 323-24.
175. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 33, § 33.04.
176. For a discussion of proximate cause, see Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248
N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, reh'g denied, 249 N.Y. 511, 164 N.E. 564 (1928).
177. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 33, § 33.04.
178. Id.
179. Northern Ins. Co. v. Ekstrom, 784 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1989).
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of an automobile, a claim for negligent entrustment of an auto-
mobile inextricably derives from or relates to the use, ownership
or operation of an automobile," and is thus unambiguously ex-
cluded from coverage by the vehicular exclusion.1 80 More simply,
because the very element that triggers the exclusion - the neg-
ligent use of a vehicle - is an essential element of the negligent
entrustment tort, the use of the vehicle is contiguous with the
entrustment and both are excluded. 181
The Seventh Circuit in Standard8 2 also relied on this prin-
ciple to relieve a homeowner insurer under similar circum-
stances.183 The court viewed negligent entrustment as undenia-
bly "intertwined with . . . the more general concepts of
ownership, operation, and use. . ." because the entrustor's liabil-
ity does not occur until the entrustee acts negligently while op-
erating the motor vehicle. 184 Stated succinctly, "but for the in-
competent driver's misconduct in the use of the automobile, no
liability could result in the entrustor . .185
2. The "Dovetail" Concept
The Colorado Supreme Court's second reason for denying
coverage was based on the "dovetail" concept. 88 Liability poli-
cies are designed to "dovetail" in the insurance business. 187 They
are "to fit together into a coordinated and unified whole,"' 88 pro-
viding non-duplicative liability coverage. 8 '
This objective is accomplished by using the same language
in an automobile policy coverage clause and a general liability
policy vehicular exclusion clause, so that the clauses are mutu-
ally exclusive. 9 ' The identical language regarding accidents
180. Northern, 784 P.2d at 323.
181. Brief for Respondent, supra note 122, at 14.
182. Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 868 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1989).
183. Standard, 868 F.2d at 898-99.
184. Id. at 898.
185. Id. at 899 (quoting Cooter v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 344 So. 2d 496, 497
(Ala. 1977)).
186. Northern, 784 P.2d at 324.
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 681).
189. Northern, 784 P.2d at 324.
190. Exclusions/Automobile, supra note 21, at 160; see e.g., Farmers Fire Ins. Co. v.
Kingsbury, 118 Misc. 2d 735, 461 N.Y.S.2d 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
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"arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, load-
ing, or unloading" of a motor vehicle is construed identically to
prevent an accident from escaping coverage under both poli-
cies.191 Instead, the accident will always be covered - but by
only one of the policies - not both.1 92 When a claim alleging
negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle arises following an ac-
cident, and there is coverage under the automobile policy, an in-
sured should be precluded from obtaining the benefit of the
higher coverage limits traditionally available under general lia-
bility insurance.19"
The insured in Northern" availed herself of the "dovetail"
concept by purchasing both an automobile policy and a CGL/
special multi-peril policy.19 5 The high court construed the vehic-
ular exclusion in the Northern policy and the coverage provision
in the automobile policy identically to prevent duplicate cover-
age, finding no ambiguity in either policy.91
In summary, the Colorado Supreme Court utilized the es-
sential element theory and the "dovetail" concept in finding that
the vehicular exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage of
negligent entrustment claims. 97 Having been persuaded by
abundant caselaw in the 1980's compelling this result, it re-
versed the Northern appellate court and overruled United Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Day,98 leaving New York the sole state juris-
diction finding coverage.1 99
191. Farmers, 118 Misc. 2d at 736-37, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 227 (quoting United Servs.
Auto. Ass'n v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 75 A.D.2d 1022, 429 N.Y.S.2d 508 (4th Dep't
1980)).
192. Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 868 F.2d 893, 898-99 n.7 (7th Cir. 1989) (cit-
ing Pedersen v. Republic Ins. Co., 72 Md. App. 661, 670, 532 A.2d 183, 188 (1987)).
193. Exclusions/Automobile, supra note 21, at 160.
194. Northern Ins. Co. v. Ekstrom, 784 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1989).
195. Northern, 784 P.2d at 321.
196. Id. at 324.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 325.
199. Exclusions/Automobile, supra note 21, at 159.
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B. Literal Terms of Clear Policy Language Should Be
Followed
The Northern court prefaced its two-point analysis by sum-
marizing the principles for interpreting insurance contracts. ' °
Although the court cited Colorado caselaw, there are similar
rules of interpretation in every state.0 1
It has long been recognized in New York that insurance pol-
icies are similar to other contracts.10 2 "[T]hey are matters of
agreement by the parties and it is the function of the [c]ourt in
a dispute to determine precisely what the agreement was and to
enforce it accordingly. '0 3 The content must be construed in ac-
cordance with the parties' intent as expressed in the clear lan-
guage of the policy. 20' Clear provisions inserted by the insurer
and accepted-by the insured cannot be disregarded. 0 5
In Breed v. Insurance Co. of North America,0 6 the New
York Court of Appeals applied the general rules of contract in-
terpretation to a homeowner insurance policy coverage dis-
pute.0 7 In attempting to recover under a homeowner policy, the
insured in Breed alleged that an ambiguity in the language ex-
isted.08 Insureds commonly make this allegation because of the
principle that ambiguities in an insurance policy are construed
against the insurer, particularly when found in an exclusion.210
200. Northern, 784 P.2d at 323.
201. 6B JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INS. LAW & PRACTICE § 4254 (Buckley ed. 1979).
202. Brief for Respondent, supra note 122, at 6 (citing MetPath, Inc. v. Birmingham
Fire Ins. Co., 86 A.D.2d 407, 412, 449 N.Y.S.2d 986, 989 (1st Dep't 1982)).
203. Id.
204. Osterhout v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 91 A.D.2d 1172, 459 N.Y.S.2d
141 (4th Dep't), afi'd, 59 N.Y.2d 846, 453 N.E.2d 541, 466 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1983).
205. MetPath, 86 A.D.2d at 412, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 989 (citing Johnson v. Travelers
Ins. Co.,' 269 N.Y. 401, 407, 199 N.E. 637, 640 (1936)).
206. 57 A.D.2d 31, 393 N.Y.S.2d 460 (3d Dep't), rev'd, 46 N.Y.2d 351, 385 N.E.2d
1280, 413 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1978). In Breed, the issue was whether a homeowners policy
exclusion, which precluded coverage for theft of property by a tenant, was clear and
unambiguous. Id. at 352, 385 N.E.2d at 1281, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 354. The insured sued the
carrier to collect the value of personal property stolen from its dwelling by a tenant, who
at the time was renting an apartment in the carriage house located on the property. Id.
at 353, 385 N.E.2d at 1281, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
207. Id. at 355, 385 N.E.2d at 1282, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
208. Id. at 354, 385 N.E.2d at 1282, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
209. Id. at 353, 385 N.E.2d at 1282, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 354 (citing Thomas J. Lipton,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 356, 361, 314 N.E.2d 37, 39, 357 N.Y.S.2d 705,
708 (1974)).
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Before the rule governing the construction of ambiguous con-
tracts is triggered, however, the court must first find ambiguity
in the policy.2"' If the words under examination have a definite
and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in
the purport of the policy itself, for which no reasonable basis for
a difference of opinion exists, there is no ambiguity.21 Finding
the modern vehicular exclusion ambiguous, and thus inapplica-
ble to negligent entrustment claims, requires an impermissible
enlargement of the insurance contract and a misreading of the
exclusion language because the terms could not more plainly
preclude coverage.2"2
Indeed, a federal circuit court has harshly condemned mi-
nority decisions mandating coverage. In Rubins Contractors,
Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co.,21 3 the District of Columbia
Circuit ruled that courts which reject the vehicular exclusion in
negligent entrustment actions torture the exclusion language." 4
It seems an extraordinary non sequitur to say that liability has
not resulted from ownership or use of an automobile merely be-
cause the [negligent entrustment] tort has a component separate
from motor vehicle operation. In effect, courts finding such exclu-
sions inapplicable appear to read the language as if it excluded
only liability arising exclusively from the insured's use of an
automobile.2 1 5
Such reasoning, the circuit court asserts, conflicts with the
doctrine of vicarious liability for motor vehicle accidents.2"6 That
doctrine also involves a component beyond the conduct of the
operator, because his negligence is imputed to another solely due
210. Id. at 355, 385 N.E.2d at 1282, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 355 (citing Hartigan v. Casualty
Co. of America, 227 N.Y. 175, 180, 124 N.E. 789, 790 (1919)).
211. Id. (citing Loch Sheldrake Assoc. v. Evans, 306 N.Y. 297, 305, 118 N.E.2d 444,
448 (1954)).
212. Cone v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.Y.2d 747, 749-50, 551 N.E.2d 92,
94, 551 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (1989) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
213. 821 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Rubins, the insured filed a declaratory judg-
ment action to determine the obligations of its automobile and business liability insurers
after a Rubins employee drove a company truck to a wedding and struck another vehicle
on the way. Id. at 672-73.
214. Id. at 676.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 677. For a definition of vicarious liability, see supra note 103.
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to some special relationship between the two.2 17 Yet vicarious li-
ability, which certainly does not arise exclusively from the use of
the vehicle, is not suggested to fall outside of the vehicular
exclusion.21s
In both Cone and the vast amount of case authority con-
trary to it, the vehicular exclusion was "framed in terms of the
instrumentality causing harm." '219 The exclusion was "broadly
worded [to clearly indicate] that the [insurance] policy was not
intended to cover any injury resulting from the use of [a motor
vehicle], irrespective of the theory on which liability rest[ed]. '22 °
The few courts finding the exclusion inapplicable have typi-
cally done so when no other insurance existed to cover the loss
and the accident victim likely would have gone uncompensated
if the insurer's denial, based upon the vehicular exclusion, had
been validated. 221 This was the situation in Cone v. Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co.2 22 Although a court's ultimate goal of ensur-
ing a potential recovery for the accident victim is laudable, "the
court should neither rewrite nor construe an insurance policy...
to provide coverage where otherwise none exists.
2 3
C. Solution: Increased Auto Policy Limits
1. The Public Interest
Any increase in insurance coverage available to the accident
victim, such as that which results from the Cone precedent, gen-
erally means that more lawsuits will be filed because the rewards
are potentially greater.224 This is especially true when either the
217. See Connell v. Hayden, 83 A.D.2d 30, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383 (2d Dep't 1981).
218. Rubins, 821 F.2d at 677. See also Fortune v. Wong, 68 Haw. 1, 702 P.2d 299
(1985). In Fortune, the modern vehicular exclusion precluded the homeowner policy's
coverage. Fortune, 68 Haw. at 1, 702 P.2d at 300. The insured's teenage son had struck a
bicyclist while operating a vehicle owned by Tasty Foods, Inc., a corporate entity con-
trolled by the insureds. Id. at 5, 11-12, 702 P.2d at 302, 306-07. Negligent entrustment
was not pleaded. Id. at 4 n.1, 702 P.2d at 302 n.1.
219. Rubins, 821 F.2d at 677.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 676.
222. Telephone Interview with Robert Kribs, Claimsperson for Nationwide Ins. Co.
(Oct. 1, 1990).
223. Brief for Respondent, supra note 122, at 6.
224. Sam H. Verhovek, Bill Would Raise Minimum for car Insurance Liability,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1990, at 25, col. 1.
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liability policy exposed is a "deep pocket" because it has higher
liability limits than the automobile policy, or when no automo-
bile coverage exists, so the liability policy is the sole source of
recovery. According to James Brodsky, senior counsel for the
American Insurance Association in Washington, D.C., "[Cone]
reflect[s] a growing trend that the homeowner's policies are be-
ing pursued by the trial bar where they're shut off from other
policies." '225
Lawsuits, because of both the cost incurred to defend them
and the higher damage awards they bring, drive up the price of
everyone's insurance premiums.2 26 The public interest is to avert
the increased premium charges that the Cone precedent necessi-
tates, yet to ensure adequate recoveries for accident victims.
2. The Preferred Alternative - Higher Automobile Pol-
icy Limits
Perhaps the Cone court's intent in ruling contrary to other
jurisdictions was to ensure adequate recoveries for New York ve-
hicular accident victims. However, the appropriate means for
achieving this result are an increase in the minimum automobile
liability insurance limits, and improved procedures for reducing
the number of uninsured motorists on New York's highways,
tasks for the state legislature.
New York State law requires automobile owners to carry au-
tomobile liability insurance to provide coverage for bodily injury
and property damage claims brought against them.22 7 The mini-
mal policy limits permitted are $10,000 per person and $20,000
per occurrence for bodily injury, and $5,000 per occurrence for
property damage.22 8 These limits have not been changed in
thirty-four years. In July 1990, seven months after Cone, the
state legislature voted to increase the minimum allowable limits
for bodily injury to $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occur-
rence."' Governor Mario Cuomo vetoed the bill, claiming it
225. Spencer, supra note 18, at 2, cols. 4-5.
226. Verhovek, supra note 224.
227. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 311(4)(a) (McKinney 1986). See also N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 60.1(a) (Rev. 1989).
228. Id.
229. Verhovek, supra note 224.
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would precipitate hefty insurance premium increases for people
least able to afford them.2 30 The bill, which had also been passed
by the legislature and vetoed by Cuomo in 1989,31 got nowhere
in the 1991 legislative session.2"2
V. Conclusion
The Cone majority erred in ruling that the modern vehicu-
lar exclusion is inapplicable when claims alleging the negligent
entrustment of a motor vehicle are brought. The victims of this
error include liability insurers, who are now forced to provide
coverage for uncontemplated risks, and their insureds, who face
premium increases to compensate for the added risks. Risks in-
volving motor vehicles should be covered by policies designed for
that purpose, and the premiums should be paid only by those
who choose to get behind the wheel.
Gerianne Hannibal
230. Angela K. Calise, Cuomo Vetoes Bill to Raise New York Auto Cover Limits,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER CO.; PROP. & CASUALTY/ EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ED., Jan. 14, 1991, at 2.
231. Id.
232. Gary Spencer, Cameras in Court Dies as Legislative Session Ends, N.Y.L.J.,
July 8, 1991, at 1.
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